I thought the proposed provision was a good one, I have voted to put it in, on the theory that if the Court adopted it, the Court would be likely to hold, if the question ever arises in litigation, that the matter is a procedural one.
William D. Mitchell to the Hon. George Wharton Pepper, a member of the Advisory Committee (December 19, 1937) .
In a recent article in this journal, Paul Carrington offered a comprehensive statement of his views about the proper function of, including the legal and prudential limits on, court rules promulgated by the Supreme Court for application in the lower federal courts. 1 First presented when Professor Carrington was concluding service as a Dean and beginning service as Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 2 the paper has evolved both in its reach and in the confidence of its conclusions. The changes reflect the enhanced time available to the author and his enduring appetite for education. They also reflect his participation in the recently revived, and surprisingly vigorous, debate about the future of American civil procedure. Indeed, Professor Carrington has assumed the role of chief defender of what he represents as the status quo: a system of uniform and trans-substantive national rules, loosely textured and relying to a great extent on judicial discretion. In his view, such a system, by preserving the appearance of political neutrality, allows the rulemakers ("technicians") to go about their business without the distractions of interest group politics and yields results that should be a source of satisfaction to all. 3 In his most recent article, for the first time, Professor Carrington confronts issues of rulemaking power. Having assisted, albeit in an "obscure and muffled" 4 way, in a successful campaign to defeat repeal of the enterprise-are badly needed in that enterprise. 8 Indeed, because Professor Carrington is the Reporter, we have less reason to be worried about one kind of judicial usurpation. His article reflects attention to issues implicating the allocation of federal powers and to the relativity of legal language that, in this context at least, was disdained by Charles Clark as it was by others among Professor Carrington's predecessors. 9 From its rich and subtle analysis of limitations law 0 to its ingenious interpretation of the Enabling Act's supersession clause, 1 the article is a fitting tribute to the memory of Walter Wheeler Cook. 12 Nonetheless, I believe that Professor Carrington has invited us to the wrong celebration and that there is reason to doubt whether any celebration is in order. Having engaged Professor Carrington's views on generalism, judicial discretion and political neutrality elsewhere,' 3 I find his views on rulemaking power no more analytically satisfying, no more faithful to the facts, and no more reassuring.
Professor Carrington attempts to demonstrate that, whatever the intent of Congress when it passed the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,14 the Supreme Court has promulgated a number of Federal Rules that regulate aspects of limitations law, either by their terms or by reason of the Court's interpretations. Although at times critical of some of these decisions, Professor Carrington at other times embraces them as authority for prospective rulemaking in the area, the propriety of which he belives is confirmed by functional analysis.
In fact, as I shall demonstrate, Professor Carrington misreads both a number of the Federal Rules and a number of the Court's decisions on which he relies. Moreover, even if it were true, which it is not, that the Court's fumbles in the limitations game somehow reached the end zone of normative (or functional) thinking, that hardly would prove that the Court can score in more important games, or that it can score at all when 8. See it plays by the rules. Perhaps, however, unlike Professor Carrington, the Court will realize that the referee already has blown the whistle.
Although those responsible for drafting and explaining the bill that became the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 were not legal realists, 15 their understanding of "practice and procedure" as used in that bill was informed by the particular legal context in which they labored. Their primary purpose was to allocate power between the Supreme Court-as rulemaker-and Congress, 16 with the new allocation restoring to the Court prospective control of procedure in actions at law that it had long held but never exercised, and that had been effectively withdrawn by the Conformity Act of 1872.17 In response to examples carefully chosen by the chief opponent of the bill, Senator Walsh, its supporters readily acknowledged that what might be deemed "practice and procedure" for other purposes was not within the bill's grant of power to the Supreme Court to make law prospectively-to act like a legislature. The most prominent of Senator Walsh's examples was limitations law. 18 .In the light of the Enabling Act's history, and even without it, the two dominant approaches to the Act-the Court's 19 and Professor Ely's 2 0 -are both flawed as exercises in interpretation and in their capacity to serve us well in the future. In each case, preoccupation with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 21 its progeny and its baggage has been a major problem. Put another way, both the Court and Professor Ely failed to heed Walter Wheeler Cook's teaching. So, I believe, has Professor Carrington.
From 1941 until 1965 the Court was willing to acknowledge only those restrictions on its rulemaking power that the prevailing Erie jurisprudence set for its power to displace state law by federal judge-made rules (federal common law). 22 42 It cannot be easy for one who acknowledges that statutory restrictions were imposed for one purpose (allocation of federal powers) to deploy Supreme Court interpretations of those restrictions deriving from a wholly different understanding (federalism), 4 3 which may explain Professor Carrington's schizophrenic treatment of Hanna 44 and his roseate view of Burlington Northern. 45 In any event, Walter Wheeler Cook would not have approved.
I believe that, under the original Enabling Act, the restrictions on court rulemaking should have been read to effect the purpose of allocating federal lawmaking power of the legislative type, not just to protect existing law, and certainly not just to protect state law. 46 A legal rule may or may not have ascertainable purposes. But we know that some legal rules, whatever policies supposedly animate them, have quite dramatic effects. Thus, I also believe that prospective federal lawmaking that necessarily and obviously involves policy choices with a predictable More fundamentally, it is confusing or worse to term any challenge to the application of a pertinent Federal Rule (as to which there was doubt in Burlington Northern) "a challenge based on the Rules of Decision Act," whatever the ground of federal jurisdiction or the source of the law claimed to apply in its stead. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the party to be brought in by amendment, that party (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party. Given that fact, however, and given that the Court unquestionably had the power to banish both fact pleading and the concept of a cause of action from federal practice, 5 6 and given that decisions discovering a new cause of action in an amended pleading were hardly predictable, 57 I will not claim overreaching.
Implicit in what I have said above, and explicit in what I have previously written about the Enabling Act, is the view that when the Supreme Court makes law through supervisory court rules, it is engaged in an enterprise that, both practically and normatively, is different in important respects from the enterprise in which the Court, or any federal court, is engaged when it makes federal common law.
5 8 Incorporation of preexisting federal common law in court rules is, on the other hand, both understandable and easy enough to defend against a technical attack so long as the common law rule is valid in both federal question and state law diversity cases. When the common law rule could not validly be applied in a state law diversity case because of Erie and its progeny, the incorporation technique is a bootstrap operation. In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiff's share or membership thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable Professor Carrington may be thought to suggest that criticism of the Court for relying on Rule 3 to provide the rule for stopping a borrowed federal period of limitations in West v. Conrail 6 1 -a federal question case-is an academic exercise, 62 although his treatment of that decision is also schizophrenic. 63 One alternative approach to the problem, and one means of rationalizing the result in West, would involve what I have called reverse incorporation: the use of an existing court rule in its incorporated substantive aspects as federal common law. 64 I harbor no serious doubts about the Court's power to fashion a uniform tolling rule for the applicable limitations period in most federal question cases. 65 The problem with reverse incorporation here is not only that Rule 3 does not reflect the accumulated experience of case law, i.e., "preexisting federal common law," and thus is not an example of incorporation; it is also that, were the Court to proceed on a case-by-case or statute-by-statute basis, it would be unlikely to find that filing is the appropriate tolling authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs. 63. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Having acknowledged that the Court "recognized the tolling effect of Rule 3 without questioning whether such a tolling rule is authorized by the Rules Enabling Act," Carrington, supra note 1, at 314, Professor Carrington asserts that "West... leaves little doubt that separation of powers considerations are... no impediment to the creation by court rule of a provision for commencement-by-filing." Id. at 316.
See
Burbank, supra note 9, at 1158-63.
The notable exception is cases governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which states:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. event for every federal and borrowed federal or state statute it encountered. 6 6 At the least, the experience might cause the Court to doubt whether the benefits of a trans-substantive tolling rule were worth the costs, including the costs to litigants of multiple sources of limitations law, 67 particularly when the Court realized that Rule 3 cannot in any event provide the solution for federal question cases brought in state court.
68
Even if the Court were to announce a trans-substantive federal tolling rule for federal question cases in state court that is identical to Rule 3, it probably would not be able to avoid problems created by another mistake it has made, first in Hanna and again in West. That mistake is the subject of comment by Professor Carrington and prompts his inquiries regarding Rule 4. I refer to the highly artificial parsing of the Massachusetts statute in Hanna into limitations provisions and "notice" provisions, 69 and a similar sleight of hand in West. 70 First, to address two of Professor Carrington's questions: 71 the Court in Hanna did not assert, and I believe that it would have denied, that it was using Rule 4 to toll (i.e., stop the running of) a statute of limitations in a diversity case. 72 To reframe and answer another of his questions, 73 71. "Should this rule (Rule 4) be given effect as a prescription of the conduct required of the plaintiff-namely the means by which notice is given to the defendant-to make a timely commencement of an action? If so, is it a valid exercise of the rulemaking power?" Carrington, supra note 1, at 319; see supra note 44.
72. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1173-76. But see Carrington, supra note 1, at 319 ("Hanna gave an affirmative answer to both questions in an action to enforce a state-created right"); id. at 320 ("Hanna did establish Rule 4 as a source of limitations law.").
73. "One may still wonder why the Court did not read Rule 4 more narrowly so that it applies only to resolve questions of the sufficiency of notice to the defendant and the power of the court over her person .... " Carrington, supra note 1, at 319. 80. In the absence of any committee reports, the explanation of the bill that was enacted given by its sponsor, Representative Edwards, is the best evidence on this point. With reference to Rule 4) he explained:
Like proposed subsection (j), H.R. 7154 provides that a dismissal for failure to serve within 120 days shall be "without prejudice". Proposed subsection @i) was criticized by some for ambiguity because, it was argued, neither the text of subsection (j) nor the Advisory Committee Note indicated whether a dismissal without prejudice would toll a statute of limitation. See House Report 97-662, at 3-4 (1982). The problem would arise when a plaintiff files the complaint within the applicable statute of limitation period but does not effect service within 120 days. If the statute of limitation period expires during that period, and if the plaintiff's action is dismissed "without prejudice," can the plaintiff refile the complaint and maintain the action? The answer depends upon how the statute of limitation is tolled.
If the law provides that the statute of limitation is tolled by filing and service of the complaint, then a dismissal under H.R. 7154 for failure to serve within the 120 days would, by the terms of the law controlling the tolling, bar the plaintiff from later maintaining the cause of action. If the law provides that the statute of limitation is tolled by fling alone, then the status of the plaintiffs's cause of action turns upon the plaintiff's diligence. If the plaintiff has not been diligent, the court will dismiss the complaint for failure to serve within 120 days, and the plaintiff will be barred from later maintaining the cause of action because the statute of limitation has run. A dismissal without prejudice does not confer upon the plaintiff any rights that the plaintiff does not otherwise possess and leaves a plaintiff whose action has been dismissed in the same position as if the action had never been filed. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to effect service, then the plaintiff can move under Rule 6(b) to enlarge the time within which to serve or can [Vol. 1989 [Vol. :1012 What then are the problems I refer to that would attend a transsubstantive federal tolling rule for federal question cases in state court? As a result of West, real uniformity as to limitations in federal question cases can come about only if the Court is willing to impose on state courts common law rules that are identical, not just to Rule 3, but also to Rule 40).81 As one who, in the context of preclusion law, has advocated clearer thinking about federal common law in state courts, 2 I await the denouement with some trepidation. Federal limitations law is a mess, one that deserves sustained congressional attention.8 3 Whatever the difficulties with reverse incorporation, imputing that process (or simply sloppy shorthand for federal common law) to the Court in West would at least permit the decision to co-exist with the Court's earlier decision in Walker v. Armco Steel Co., a diversity state law case. 84 In contrast, taking West at face value as a direct application of Rule 3 rather than an expression of federal common law incorporating Rule 3, the two cases can be reconciled only if Rule 3 is accorded two "plain meaning[s]," 8 5 -one for diversity state law cases and another for oppose dismissal for failure to serve. A court would undoubtedly permit such a plaintiff additional time within which to effect service. Thus, a diligent plaintiff can preserve the cause of action. This result is consistent with the policy behind the time limit for service and with statutes of limitation, both of which are designed to encourage prompt movement of civil actions in the federal courts. 128 CONG. REc. 30,931-32 (1982) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The footnote omitted at the end of the first quoted paragraph imparts special irony to the use Professor Carrington makes of Rule 4(j), as well as to the assertions he makes about Rule 4. See supra note 79.
The law governing the tolling of a statute of limitation depends upon the type of civil action involved. In a diversity action, state law governs tolling. Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to the contrary notwithstanding, shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (emphasis added).
For the text following amendment, see supra note 5. With the exception of the language regarding supersession, the changes to section 2072 proposed in the Senate bill, which was enacted, were identical to those proposed in the House bill, 11 9 their source. Proposed section 2072 contains limitations on the rulemaking power, careful observance of which is essential in the future if problems of the sort that prompted this legislation are not to recur.
The most important of these limitations is that rules promulgated by the Supreme Court for lower federal courts (supervisory court rules) be "rules of practice and procedure" that do not "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." The language is derived from current law. As interpreted by the Court, however, the language has little if any determinative content. As a result, the rules enabling acts have failed to provide guidance to the rulemakers or to Congress in considering the validity of proposed rules.
It appears that, as used in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the restriction regarding substantive rights was intended to emphasize some of the limitations on the delegation of prospective lawmaking power thought to inhere in the notion of court rules of "practice and procedure." Because there is no shared conception of such limitations today, the Committee believes that it must take some care in stating its views on the scope of Congress' delegation under proposed section 2072.
First, it is not the purpose of proposed section 2072 merely to restate whatever may be the constitutional restraints on the exercise of Congress' lawmaking power as against that of the States or on the delegation of Congress' lawmaking power to the Supreme Court. Rather, proposed section 2072 contains independent limitations on supervisory court rulemaking, which Congress has the power to impose and which have the effect of delegating only a portion of Congress' power. Second, Congress' lawmaking power regarding matters of practice and procedure extends to all litigation in the federal courts. The limitations on rulemaking imposed by proposed section 2072 therefore protect Congress' prerogatives as to all such cases, not just those in which state law furnishes the rule of decision. Thus, for instance, the legislation is fully operative as to bankruptcy rules, which are formulated for cases that are within exclusive federal jurisdiction and that are governed largely by federal substantive law.
Third, the limitations on rulemaking in proposed section 2072 protect some lawmaking that has already occurred. In addition and more generally, the limitations reserve for Congress, within its constitutionally permitted domain, decisions as to whether there should be prospective federal regulation of certain matters and what the content of that regulation should be. Where Congress chooses not to legislate on matters reserved to it by the operation of the limitations on supervisory court rulemaking in proposed section 2072, the determination whether in a particular case state law applies or there is pertinent and valid federal law (i.e., federal common law) depends upon other sources of federal lawmaking authority.
127
Turning to the implementation of the bill's restrictions on supervisory court rulemaking, the Report continues:
Fourth, the substantive rights protected by proposed section 2072 include rights conferred, or that might be conferred, by rules of substantive law, such as "the right not to be injured . . . by another's negligence" or the right not to be subject to discrimination in employment on the basis of race. Thus, the bill does not confer power on the Supreme Court to promulgate rules regarding matters, such as limitations and preclusion, that necessarily and obviously define or limit rights under the substantive law. The protection extends beyond rules of substantive law, narrowly defined, however. At the least, it also prevents the application of rules, otherwise valid, where such rules would have the effect of altering existing remedial rights conferred as an integral part of the applicable substantive law scheme, federal or state, such as arrangements for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. More generally, proposed section 2072 is intended to allocate to Congress, as opposed to the Supreme Court exercising delegated legislative power, If this House Report explaining the language enacted by Congress is relevant to the interpretation of amended section 2072, it would seem to provide substantial guidance on the questions addressed by Professor Carrington, and in particular to demonstrate that whatever may have been true prior to December 1, 1988, the Supreme Court now lacks the power "to promulgate rules regarding matters, such as limitations and preclusion, that necessarily and obviously define or limit rights under the substantive law." 12 9 Disregard of the House Judiciary Committee's attempt to "take some care in stating its views on the scope of Congress' delegation under proposed section 2072"130 requires either specific evidence that that attempt should not be given weight or a general theory to the same effect. As to specific evidence, the relevant statutory language remained the same from H.R. 3550 to the legislation that was enacted; the House was responsible for that language, and the 1988 House Report incorporated by reference the 1985 House Report, where the language received close attention. 13 1 There was no committee report on the 1988 Senate bill, and in his explanatory remarks, Senator Heflin acknowledged that "the Kastenmeier subcommittee ha[d] been the leader in developing.., a number of significant matters in the bill, such as the titles dealing with arbitration and the rules enabling act amendments." 1 32 Moreover, he stated that "[tihe purpose of the amendments to the rules enabling acts is to modernize the statutory framework, respond to criticism surrounding the process and promote openness and participation in the rulemaking process."
133
On the other hand, the section-by-section analysis of the Senate bill stated that subsection 2072(a) "consolidates but carries forward current law" 134 and that amended subsection 2072(b) "also carries forward the scope of current law." 135 Both references might, but need not, be thought to include judicial interpretations as well as statutory language.
In any event, unlike both the 1985 and 1988 House Judiciary Committee reports, which were available to the members of the House (and Senate) prior to the sessions at which action was taken, 136 this analysis was first 132. 134 CONG. REc. S16,294 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Heflin).
133. Id. at S16,295. The reference to both a purpose to "respond to criticism surrounding the process" and a purpose to "promote openness and participation in the rulemaking process" is signifi- 134. 134 CONG. REc. S16,300 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988).
Id.
136. See 134 CONG. REc. H7452 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("For further analysis of each title, I recommend a reading of the House report that has been available to all Members"). See id. at H7452-53 ("Title I has also passed the House on two previous occasions").
available to the members of the Senate during the late evening session when the Senate bill was discussed and approved. 137 We have, then, a situation in which the body responsible for developing amendments to legislation sought through detailed legislative history to guard against the assumption that similar statutory language should be given the same meaning by the courts, while the expectations of the other body in that regard remain unclear.
1 3 8
As to a general theory, Professor Carrington notes the "difficulties that inhere in any use of legislative history,"' 139 as well as difficulties peculiar to the interpretation of the 1934 Enabling Act in the light of "long usage." 14 0 I have previously addressed the latter subject at length, 14 ' but, because we are in a new ballgame, both my analysis and Professor Carrington's comments may be irrelevant. Depending on one's view of the specific evidence discussed above, agreement with Professor Carrington may require rejection of legislative history as an aid to statutory interpretation, at least in most cases. There are, of course, those who hold that view, including some in high places. 142 Although the campaign thus to empower federal judges at the expense of Congress will doubtless continue, however inconsistently waged, 143 the Court as a whole has recently "explicitly reject[ed]" a broad argument against the use of legislative history, reaffirming its "traditional approach" to legislative history as "the sounder and more democratic course, the course that strives for allegiance to Congress' desires in all cases, not just those where Congress'
137. Telephone interview with Monique Abacherli, Chief Clerk of the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 14, 1989). See also 134 CONG. REc. S16,294 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Heflin) ("Because of the limited time remaining in this Congress, there will not be a committee report accompanying S. 1482. I will describe the provisions of the bill and then will submit for the record a more lengthy explanation providing background and section-by-section analysis.").
H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 216 (1967) (footnote omitted):
Hence, if an intent clearly expressed in committee reports is within the permissible limits of the language and no construction manifestly more reasonable suggests itself, a court does pretty well to read the statute to mean what the few legislators having the greatest concern with it said it meant to them. Cf Burbank, supra note 9, at 1101-04 (post-1934 developments, including reenactment, do not signify congressional approval of the Court's interpretations).
139. Carrington, supra note 1, at 308 (footnote omitted). [Vol. 1989 [Vol. :1012 statutory directive is plainly sensible or borders on the lunatic." 144 Such allegiance seems particularly fitting here, because the "statutory limitations in question were intended to confine the power of the Court itself." 145 Finally, I turn to Professor Carrington's defense of the Enabling Act's supersession provision. I earlier called his proposed interpretation of that clause "ingenious."
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It evidently derives from Professor Carrington's desire to preserve the myth of a uniform, trans-substantive and politically neutral procedural system and, as to the last feature, to impart some reality to the myth. The reversal that his proposed interpretation would effect in the respective roles of federalism and allocation of powers under the Enabling Act is as surprising as it is refreshing. 1 47 Coming from Professor Carrington, the proposed interpretation is also surprising because it purchases political neutrality at the cost of trans- 155 There is no more reason to believe that the Supreme Court will abnegate power in interpreting the supersession clause, than that it will overrule Hanna. We should consider-although Professor Carrington does not-the possibility that his interpretation, originally offered before the 1988 legislation, 15 6 finds support in that legislation or its history. The text of the supersession clause has remained the same. 15 7 The House Judiciary Committee certainly did not share Professor Carrington's narrow view of the "laws" subject to supersession; quite the contrary. 1 58 But the House yielded on the retention of the clause. 15 9 Again, there was no committee report in the Senate. In his remarks explaining S. 1482, however, Senator Heflin observed:
The most controversial provision of the rules enabling acts concerns the so-called supersession clause, which is a provision in current law, except with respect to bankruptcy rules. Under present supersession practice, when a Federal rule conflicts with any procedural component of a previously enacted statute, the rule governs. If the statute has been enacted later than the rule or if the conflict involves substantive rather than procedural rights, then the statute governs. 16 This passage in the legislative history might be thought to support Professor Carrington's interpretation. There may, however, be a difference-potentially a big difference-between "substantive" and "arguably substantive" rights or laws. That aside, the passage is not a correct statement of "present supersession practice," that is, of practice under the pre-1988 provision. 1 61 Moreover, and in part for that reason, the reference to "substantive rather than procedural rights" suggests that Senator Heflin was conflating the issues of validity and supersession and thus assuring his colleagues, as Professor Carrington has assured us, that "sub- Finally, a related point: the passage gives evidence of a sin akin to that which Professor Carrington, following Walter Wheeler Cook, has deplored.' 64 Here, however, the problem is not the assumption that "procedure" and "substantive rights" have the same meaning when used 160. 134 CONG. REc. S16,296 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Heflin). 161. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50; infra note 203 and accompanying text. 162. Carrington, supra note 1, at 323. 163. See supra note 151. In a letter that was influential to the decision in the House not to insist on the deletion of the supersession clause, see infra text accompanying note 178, Chief Justice Rehnquist made the same linkage, observing:
The Judicial Conference and its committees on rules have participated in the rules promulgation process for over a half century. During this time they have always been keenly aware of the special responsibility they have in the rules process and the duty incumbent upon them not to overreach their charter. for different purposes, but that they have the same meaning to different speakers for the same purpose. The problem arises because, as the experience with proposals to amend Rule 68 demonstrates, lawmaking often involves a choice between policies that all would agree are procedural (i.e., docket-clearing) and those that all would agree are substantive (i.e., encouraging enforcement of federal law by private plaintiffs). The view one takes of the product of the lawmaking enterprise-is the provision procedural or substantive?-is likely to depend on the policies that triumph in the process.
165
I will not elaborate other objections to Professor Carrington's proposed interpretation of the supersession clause, including the objection that it might encourage continuing neglect of the Act's basic restrictions on court rulemaking, particularly as regards state law cases. 166 Nor will I elaborate possible constitutional objections to the supersession clause itself, which is hard to square with the vision of separation of powers projected by INS v. Chadha.1 67 Legislation is legislation, no matter how we choose to characterize it. 168 In an age of both computerized statutes and court rules that eschew policy choices, 169 I have yet to hear a good argument why those rules should not be assimilated to, that is, treated like federal common law, at least in the requirement that they respect Congress' policy choices. 1 70 Having read Professor Carrington's discussion of the "three functions" of supersession, 171 I am still waiting.
According to Professor Carrington, supersession is "functionally linked to the requirement that rules be reported to Congress." 1 72 This, of course, is not an independent argument in favor of supersession. Moreover, there was no link at all between the supersession clause and that requirement historically. Supersession first appeared in a bill to grant the 165. See Burbank, supra note 8, at 435-39; supra note 158. Thus, a major benefit of repeal of the supersession clause would be to render the procedure/substance dichotomy irrelevant in the event of inconsistency between a federal statute and a subsequently promulgated Federal Rule. Its retention puts a greater premium on attention to the Act's basic restrictions, if not by the rulemakers, then by Congress. See infra text accompanying note 198. 166. See infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text. More generally, Professor Carrington's interpretation, if adopted, might reinforce the erroneous interpretation of the Act's basic restrictions as concerned with the protection of existing policy choices rather than with the allocation of power to make policy choices. 
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Court rulemaking power for actions at law in 1914;173 the reporting provision appeared ten years later in connection with the expansion of the grant to authorize a merged system of law and equity rules. 1 74 They were thought to serve wholly distinct purposes. 1 7 5 Nor is there any contemporary functional link, although Professor Carrington argues to the contrary. As he would have it, reporting serves to alert Congress to the potential for supersession. Without supersession, there would be no need for reporting.
176
Reporting can "assure[ ] congressional knowledge of, and passive acceptance of any supersession" ' 177 only if the rulemakers are scrupulous in identifying statutory provisions that would be superseded by proposed Federal Rules or amendments. Happily, Chief Justice Rehnquist has assured the Congress that the rulemakers will be scrupulous in the future, an assurance that may have been essential to the passage of the 1988 legislation. 1 78 The Chief Justice's assertion that such had been "generally the approach.., undertaken in the past" 179 is, however, sheer revisionism. One looks in vain for statements in the materials accompanying the Appellate Rules 8 0 that they would have the superseding effects subsequently imputed to them in the cases cited by Professor Carrington. 175. See sources cited supra notes 173-74. Although there was an argument to be made, and Dean Clark made it with typical tenacity, that the 1934 Enabling Act did not require the reporting of amendments to Congress, Congress was assured that they would be reported and relied on that assurance. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1153-54 n.601. essential to informed public comment, it is hard to believe that the rulemakers were simply holding back until a later stage. More likely, they simply did not notice. The fact is that, at least in recent years, the rulemakers have evinced a shocking ignorance of, or disregard for, statutory law. 183 Professor Carrington's article suggests his good intentions with respect to legislation, but his treatment of the 1983 legislation amending Rule 4184 and indeed of the 1988 legislation amending the Enabling Acts 18 5 are like the stroke of the thirteenth hour, casting doubt on all that-comes before. In any event, one individual's good intentions are hardly a firm basis for enduring public policy.
The notion that reporting is "not necessary to protect substantive rights established by Congress, for these cannot be abridged, enlarged or modified" 18 6 at least has historical lineage, however dubious, supersession is irrelevant with respect to state law. 193 Although it is heartening that he recognizes at least some of the Enabling Act's implications for separation of powers, we should not forget either that federalism has dominated debates about rulemaking power for the last fifty years or that federalism remains a concern, even if only derivatively. t94 Under Professor Carrington's view of the reporting requirement, who would watch the watchmen when the concern was the inappropriate displacement of state law?
The possibility of supersession may furnish an additional "inducement" to those who "perceive that their substantive interests are threatened by a proposed amendment, to marshal their political resources for self-protection. "' 195 But neither the part of our legal landscape occupied by federal as opposed to state law, the appearance of political neutrality that Professor Carrington so values in Federal Rules, 19 6 nor the rulemakers' track-record in alerting interested parties to the possibility of supersession 197 suggests that it is of much practical importance in that regard. Moreover, the argument is not what one would expect from one who has asserted both that reporting is not necessary to protect substantive rights, and that "arguably substantive" statutes are not subject to supersession. In the absence of serious and sustained attention to the Enabling Act's limitations by the rulemakers and the Court, reporting remains "an important check on overreaching."' 1 98 It would remain important even if there were no supersession clause, if only because existing congressional statutes embody only some of the substantive rights protected by those limitations. Far from providing "focus for congressional review," 1 99 the supersession clause increases the pressure on Congress to delay or defeat the effectiveness of proposed Federal Rules reported to it and thus makes it harder for Congress to achieve an important goal of the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Acts: "prevent[ing] controversy of the sort that has plagued federal supervisory court rulemaking in recent years." '2°°P rofessor Carrington's second functional justification of supersession is on sounder ground historically, but it rests on questionable factual and theoretical premises. According to that justification, supersession permits the rulemaking process to "clear away from the timbers of important and enduring federal legislation the undergrowth of procedural marginalia that have been attached to legislation for faded or forgotten reasons. '20 1 And, according to Professor Carrington, it does so only with "notice to Congress" and only with respect to "matters of 'practice and procedure' having no substantive consequences.
'20 2
In effect, Professor Carrington identifies as "political" only that which is recognized as of interest by some coherent (and, apparently, wholly self-interested) group. According to this view, "neutrality" means "reduc[ing] the level of political interest in procedural rules." And according to this view, both substance-specific procedures and empirical investigation of supposedly neutral rules are anathema: the former because they will be likely to attract rather than "deflect political attention" and the latter because data on experience under the Rules may cause organized groups to realize that they have a stake and hence to regard the "neutral" rule as a legitimate object of political interest.
there should be very few statutory provisions remaining that are inconsistent with Federal Rules. And if so, it is hard to understand why Congress' stated reason for repealing the supersession clause for Bankruptcy Rules in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978209 is not generally applicable. As explained in the Senate Report: "This bill extensively revises the bankruptcy law. Nearly all procedural matters have been removed and left to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Consequently, the need to permit the Supreme Court's rules to supersede the statute no longer exists. To the extent a rule is inconsistent, the statute will govern. '210 If the Court is right about Congress's general attitude, those few cases where supersession remains possible are likely to involve inconsistency resulting from an advertent exercise of policy judgment by Congress in the face of a contrary policy judgment by the rulemakers. In this context, the question of supersession is whether the rulemakers should be able to come back with a rule reasserting their policy preference, or asserting a wholly new policy preference, and thus require Congress again to pass, and the President again to sign, legislation in order to prevail. Professor Carrington praises supersession as "contribut[ing] over time to the maintenance of rules that are general and a rulemaking process that is appropriately neutral." 2 1 1 Implementing the work of one who advocates a "veil of ignorance" 2 12 that would shield the rulemakers from the possible substantive side effects of their rules, the supersession clause also deprives Congress of the ability to respond, discretely and effectively, to proof of disproportionate substantive impact-and all in the service of rules whose uniformity, trans-substantivity, simplicity, and predictability are a mirage.
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Professor Carrington's final functional justification of supersession is that it "signiflies] one aspect of the relationship between Congress and the federal courts as co-equal branches of the government." 2 14 As that justification may suggest, the view one takes of supersession may ultimately depend on the value one places on symbols. I am uncomfortable with the messages conveyed by the supersession clause, but it at least once served a useful purpose. 2 15 Today, as I have suggested, one message may be that notwithstanding the Chief Justice's reassuring words, the rulemakers need not be concerned about Congress's policy choices as they go about their work. 2 16 A far more troublesome message is that the policy preferences of judges and their advisers, acting in a legislative capacity but without popular mandate or all of the restraining influences of the legislative process, are entitled to supremacy when they conflict with the policy preferences of the people's representatives. Whether or not the supersession clause is consistent with the formal requirements of the Constitution, it is not, at least for me, consistent with the vision of a democratic society that inspires that document.
History alone does not permit us to assume that future Reporters will share Professor Carrington's qualities. Those qualities, however, have already served the rulemaking process well. We can only hope that in shaping the procedure of the twenty-first century even greater attention will be paid to the concern that, if the rulemakers are left to make choices as to matters that are rationally capable of classification as either procedure or substance, "they will choose to advance those policies that are their special province and to subordinate those that are not. '2 17 Perhaps that hope too is wishful thinking, but with me it has "all the tenacity of original sin." 
